The propensity to patent in oligopolistic markets

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the strategic protection decision of an innovator between a patent and secrecy in a setting with horizontally differentiated products. By introducing the patenting decision into the well known circular city model, the impact of the disclosure requirement linked to a patent application as well as the problem of legally inventing around a patent can be taken into account. Asymmetry in the circular market leads to a consumer migration effect. We find that secrecy may be the innovator's profit maximizing strategy whenever the mandatory disclosure of information enhances the market entry of competitors.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 323

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing ; Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
• Subject: patenting decision ; secrecy ; disclosure requirement ; patent breadth ; horizontal product differentiation ; circular city ; Innovation ; Patent ; Geheimhaltung ; Lizenzvergabe ; Produktdifferenzierung ; Räumlicher Wettbewerb ; Oligopol ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Zaby, Alexandra K.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
• (where): Tübingen
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40322
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-42006
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET