Arbeitspapier
On the Welfare Effects of Adverse Selection in Oligopolistic Markets
We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection. Principals pay informational rents due to asymmetric information and sell their output in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly. We find that asymmetric information may mitigate or more than compensate the welfare reducing impact of market power, irrespective of whether the number of firms is given exogenously or determined endogenously by a profit constraint. We further show that welfare in a setting with adverse selection may be higher than the maximized welfare level attainable in a world with perfect observability.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10003
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
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adverse selection
oligopoly
welfare
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
de Pinto, Marco
Goerke, Laszlo
Palermo, Alberto
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- de Pinto, Marco
- Goerke, Laszlo
- Palermo, Alberto
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2022