Arbeitspapier

On the Welfare Effects of Adverse Selection in Oligopolistic Markets

We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection. Principals pay informational rents due to asymmetric information and sell their output in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly. We find that asymmetric information may mitigate or more than compensate the welfare reducing impact of market power, irrespective of whether the number of firms is given exogenously or determined endogenously by a profit constraint. We further show that welfare in a setting with adverse selection may be higher than the maximized welfare level attainable in a world with perfect observability.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10003

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Regulation
Thema
adverse selection
oligopoly
welfare

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
de Pinto, Marco
Goerke, Laszlo
Palermo, Alberto
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • de Pinto, Marco
  • Goerke, Laszlo
  • Palermo, Alberto
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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