Arbeitspapier
Strategy-proof and anonymous allocation rules of indivisible goods: A new characterization of Vickrey allocation rule
We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a government distributes equally divided lands to households. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 648
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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strategy-proofness
anonymity
indivisible good
Vickrey allocation rule
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (where)
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Osaka
- (when)
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2006
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Time of origin
- 2006
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