Port privatization in an international oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

We investigate how port privatization affects port charges, firm profits, and welfare. Our model consists of an international duopoly with two ports and two markets. When the unit transport cost is large, privatization of ports decreases the prices for port usage, although neither government has an incentive to privatize its port. The equilibrium governmental decisions are inconsistent with the desirable outcome if the unit transport cost is not large enough. The smaller country's government is more likely to privatize its port, although the larger country's government is more likely to nationalize its port to protect its domestic market.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 864

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
• Subject: Port ; Privatization ; Port charge ; Oligopoly ; Strategic trade policy ; Hafen ; Privatisierung ; Gebühr ; Transportkosten ; Strategische Handelspolitik ; Oligopol ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Matsushima, Noriaki ; Takauchi, Kazuhiro
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92751
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET