Contests – A comparison of timing and information structures

Arbeitspapier

We study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents. We consider four institutional settings: Contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information. We find that an effort-maximizing designer of the contest prefers the sequential to the simultaneous setting from an ex ante perspective. Moreover, the sequential contest Pareto dominates the simultaneous one when the contestants’ types are sufficiently negatively correlated. Regarding the information structure, the designer ex ante prefers private information while the contestants prefer public information.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2011-6

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: sequential contests ; asymmetric information ; rent-seeking ; Wettbewerb ; Extensives Spiel ; Asymmetrische Information ; Rent-Seeking ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ludwig, Sandra
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
• (where): München
• (when): 2011

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.12209
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104333
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-12209-9
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET