The Political Economy of the Decline in Antitrust Enforcement in the United States

Arbeitspapier

Antitrust enforcement in the United States has declined since the 1960s. We investigate the political causes of this decline by looking at who made the crucial decisions and the strength of their popular mandate. Using a novel framework to understand the determinants of regulatory capture and several new datasets, we find that there was no public support for the weakening of antitrust enforcement. The decline in antitrust enforcement was the result of a collection of technocratic decisions made in politically unaccountable ways, mostly by regulators and judges. Behind the scenes, big business played a major role in influencing these agents; but other factors (like the increase in private sector pay relative to government pay) and intellectual currents mattered as well.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: New Working Paper Series ; No. 315

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lancieri, Filippo ; Posner, Eric ; Zingales, Luigi
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State
• (where): Chicago, IL
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/262717
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET