Arbeitspapier

Sanction-busting through tax havens

Financial sanctions, which aim to economically hurt a target by restricting its access to financial assets and markets, require the ability to identify who owns an asset. Although experts have long claimed that offshore financial centres that offer secrecy ('tax havens') undermine sanctions by hiding ownership information, so far data limitations have prevented a rigorous test of this claim. We overcome this constraint using data from the Bank of International Settlements and the Offshore Leaks Database and conduct the first systematic analysis of the role that tax havens play in financial sanction evasion. Our main finding is that sanction targets reduce their funds in sanctioning countries while increasing their funds in tax havens. This displacement effect is stronger when the sanction coalition includes the United States or comprises more FATF or OECD members. Lastly, whether a tax haven is in the sanctioning coalition does not seem to make a difference. These findings confirm that target countries evade sanctions by moving large portions of their funds from sanctioning countries to tax havens. More broadly, our paper highlights a novel and geostrategically important role of tax havens in global finance.

ISBN
978-92-9267-363-5
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WIDER Working Paper ; No. 2023/55

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
International Economic Order and Integration
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
Thema
sanctions
financial markets
tax havens
Offshore Leaks Database
offshore financial centres

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kavakl¸, Kerim Can
Marcolongo, Giovanna
Zambiasi, Diego
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2023

DOI
doi:10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2023/363-5
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kavakl¸, Kerim Can
  • Marcolongo, Giovanna
  • Zambiasi, Diego
  • The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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