Tax Havens, Accounting Experts, and Fee-Setting Rules

Arbeitspapier

Tax havens differ in the specific tax planning arrangements multinational firms can use to reduce their tax liabilities. Given the complexity and cost associated with identifying the most effective tax haven to use, an accounting firm can act as an intermediary between tax havens and multinational corporations. We analyze a model with horizontally differentiated multinationals and tax havens to study the role accounting firm intermediation has on tax haven prices, multinational tax planning choices, accounting firm profits, and tax revenues. In equilibrium, uniform accounting firm fees generate higher accounting firm profit, less tax avoidance, and higher tax revenues than either full price discrimination or haven-specific fees.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6774

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Accounting ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects ; International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
• Thema: tax haven ; accounting firm ; horizontal differentiation ; double marginalization ; fee-setting rules

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gresik, Thomas A. ; Konrad, Kai A.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/173050
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ