Arbeitspapier

Voluntary Disclosure Schemes for Offshore Tax Evasion: An Analysis

In recent years tax authorities worldwide have implemented voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on offshore investments. Such Schemes are characterized by the acquisition of non-audit information on offshore holdings, and a subsequent opportunity for affected taxpayers to make a voluntary disclosure. Accepted disclosures are subject to a discounted .ne rate, but verified under-disclosure attracts a higher penalty. We characterize the optimal Scheme and show that an optimal Scheme can generate a Pareto-improvement over the optimal auditing equilibrium without a Scheme, and can stimulate legitimate offshore investment activity. We show when a tax authority optimally gives incentives for truthful disclosure, and when it does not. The analysis yields practical design insights for policymakers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5750

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Thema
voluntary disclosure
offshore tax evasion
tax amnesty
third-party information

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gould, Matthew
Rablen, Matthew
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gould, Matthew
  • Rablen, Matthew
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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