Arbeitspapier
Voluntary Disclosure Schemes for Offshore Tax Evasion: An Analysis
In recent years tax authorities worldwide have implemented voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on offshore investments. Such Schemes are characterized by the acquisition of non-audit information on offshore holdings, and a subsequent opportunity for affected taxpayers to make a voluntary disclosure. Accepted disclosures are subject to a discounted .ne rate, but verified under-disclosure attracts a higher penalty. We characterize the optimal Scheme and show that an optimal Scheme can generate a Pareto-improvement over the optimal auditing equilibrium without a Scheme, and can stimulate legitimate offshore investment activity. We show when a tax authority optimally gives incentives for truthful disclosure, and when it does not. The analysis yields practical design insights for policymakers.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5750
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Thema
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voluntary disclosure
offshore tax evasion
tax amnesty
third-party information
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gould, Matthew
Rablen, Matthew
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gould, Matthew
- Rablen, Matthew
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2016