Arbeitspapier
Turning a blind eye, but not the other cheek: On the robustness of costly punishment
Prior research demonstrates a willingness to incur costs to punish norm violators. But, how strong are the motives underlying such acts? Will people rely on "excuses" to avoid acting on costly punishment intentions, as with other costly pro-social acts? In a laboratory experiment, we find that third parties punish reluctantly: they state a preference to punish, but avoid the opportunity when doing so does not reveal this as their preference. In contrast, second parties - those directly wronged - are resolute punishers: they actively seek out the opportunity to punish. Our findings highlight important differences in motives underlying second- and third-party punishment.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 185
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- Subject
-
Experiment
third-party punishment
second-party punishment
fairness
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Kriss, Peter H.
Weber, Roberto A.
Xiao, Erte
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Zurich
- (when)
-
2015
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-105335
- Handle
- Last update
-
2025-03-10T11:44:12+0100
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kriss, Peter H.
- Weber, Roberto A.
- Xiao, Erte
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2015
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