Arbeitspapier
Turning a blind eye? Compliance to minimum wages and employment
In this paper, we explore the relationship between non-compliance with bargained minimum wages and employment. We illustrate the role of labour courts with respect to the Constitutional provision of "fair" wage and sketch a model in which firms choose their desired levels of employment and non-compliance. We show that when employers internalize the expected costs of non-compliance, the effect of deviating from the bargained minimum wages on employment levels are modest, or null. Using data from the Italian LFS, we find evidence of a positive, but small, trade-off between non-compliance and employment. We discuss the policy implications of these findings for wage bargaining, also considering the costs that "turning a blind eye" to non-compliance implies for the Italian system of industrial relations.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 85
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Labor Economics Policies
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
Labor Standards: Workers' Rights
- Thema
-
Collective bargaining
sectoral minimum wages
compliance
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Garnero, Andrea
Lucifora, Claudio
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
- (wo)
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Milano
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Garnero, Andrea
- Lucifora, Claudio
- Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
Entstanden
- 2020