Arbeitspapier

Turning a blind eye? Compliance to minimum wages and employment

In this paper, we explore the relationship between non-compliance with bargained minimum wages and employment. We illustrate the role of labour courts with respect to the Constitutional provision of "fair" wage and sketch a model in which firms choose their desired levels of employment and non-compliance. We show that when employers internalize the expected costs of non-compliance, the effect of deviating from the bargained minimum wages on employment levels are modest, or null. Using data from the Italian LFS, we find evidence of a positive, but small, trade-off between non-compliance and employment. We discuss the policy implications of these findings for wage bargaining, also considering the costs that "turning a blind eye" to non-compliance implies for the Italian system of industrial relations.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 85

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Labor Economics Policies
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
Labor Standards: Workers' Rights
Thema
Collective bargaining
sectoral minimum wages
compliance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Garnero, Andrea
Lucifora, Claudio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Garnero, Andrea
  • Lucifora, Claudio
  • Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)

Entstanden

  • 2020

Ähnliche Objekte (12)