The political economy of sin taxes

Arbeitspapier

We analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self-control problems. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the socially optimal corrective tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self-control problems. Further, we analyse how individuals with self-control problems would vote on taxes on the consumption of harmful goods, and show that the equilibrium tax is typically below the socially optimal level. When the redistributive effects of sin taxes are taken into account, the difference between the social optimum and equilibrium is small at low levels of harm, but becomes more pronounced when consumption is more harmful.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2650

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Thema: excise taxation ; voting ; self-control ; Genussmittel ; Optimale Besteuerung ; Konsumentenverhalten ; Beschränkte Rationalität ; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Haavio, Markus ; Kotakorpi, Kaisa Ilona
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30626
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ