Arbeitspapier

Differentiation of Green Taxes: A Political-Economy Analysis for Germany

In this paper we study political-economy determinants of the differentiation of environmental taxes between sectors. Using a common-agency model, we provide predictions on tax differentiation which are then tested using data from the German Ecological Tax Reform. As the reform is revenue neutral and reduces labor costs, tax differentiation is not only determined by the activity of lobby groups favoring reduced tax rates, but also by the groups? interest in revenue rebates to labor. Empirical data underpin our theoretical findings: A regression analysis of Germany?s green tax reform explains environmental tax differentiation by the presence of sectoral interest groups. Besides market concentration and energy demand elasticities, the exposure of industries to international trade flows plays an important role in the environmental tax design.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 06-003

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Externalities
Thema
environmental tax reform
interest groups
common agency
Ökosteuer
Steuerreform
Arbeitskosten
Interessenpolitik
Branche
Schätzung
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Anger, Niels
Böhringer, Christoph
Lange, Andreas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Anger, Niels
  • Böhringer, Christoph
  • Lange, Andreas
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Entstanden

  • 2006

Ähnliche Objekte (12)