Arbeitspapier
Differentiation of Green Taxes: A Political-Economy Analysis for Germany
In this paper we study political-economy determinants of the differentiation of environmental taxes between sectors. Using a common-agency model, we provide predictions on tax differentiation which are then tested using data from the German Ecological Tax Reform. As the reform is revenue neutral and reduces labor costs, tax differentiation is not only determined by the activity of lobby groups favoring reduced tax rates, but also by the groups? interest in revenue rebates to labor. Empirical data underpin our theoretical findings: A regression analysis of Germany?s green tax reform explains environmental tax differentiation by the presence of sectoral interest groups. Besides market concentration and energy demand elasticities, the exposure of industries to international trade flows plays an important role in the environmental tax design.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 06-003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Externalities
- Thema
-
environmental tax reform
interest groups
common agency
Ökosteuer
Steuerreform
Arbeitskosten
Interessenpolitik
Branche
Schätzung
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Anger, Niels
Böhringer, Christoph
Lange, Andreas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Anger, Niels
- Böhringer, Christoph
- Lange, Andreas
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2006