Arbeitspapier

Mission Impossible!? On the Harmonization of National Allocation Plans under the EU Emissions Trading Directive

Starting in 2005, the EU will implement a CO2 emissions trading scheme. In this paper we show that the outspoken goals of economic efficiency and free allocation of allowances are incompatible with harmonized allocation rules. In general, the assignment of allowances is endogenous and differs widely across countries, thereby substantiating concerns for implicit state aid and competitive distortions. We discuss potential adjustments to the Directive in order to allow for harmonization, i.e. for identical assignment factors to similar firms located in different EU countries.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 04-15

Classification
Wirtschaft
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Environmental Economics: General
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
Subject
emissions trading
allowance allocation
national allocation plan
competitive distortions
Emissionshandel
EU-Umweltpolitik
Allokation
EU-Staaten

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Böhringer, Christoph
Lange, Andreas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Böhringer, Christoph
  • Lange, Andreas
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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