Arbeitspapier
Mission Impossible!? On the Harmonization of National Allocation Plans under the EU Emissions Trading Directive
Starting in 2005, the EU will implement a CO2 emissions trading scheme. In this paper we show that the outspoken goals of economic efficiency and free allocation of allowances are incompatible with harmonized allocation rules. In general, the assignment of allowances is endogenous and differs widely across countries, thereby substantiating concerns for implicit state aid and competitive distortions. We discuss potential adjustments to the Directive in order to allow for harmonization, i.e. for identical assignment factors to similar firms located in different EU countries.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 04-15
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Environmental Economics: General
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
- Thema
-
emissions trading
allowance allocation
national allocation plan
competitive distortions
Emissionshandel
EU-Umweltpolitik
Allokation
EU-Staaten
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Böhringer, Christoph
Lange, Andreas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Böhringer, Christoph
- Lange, Andreas
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2004