The political economics of not paying taxes

Arbeitspapier

This paper considers redistributive as well as political consequences of tax avoidance. When investing in tax avoidance is possible, the official tax rate does not necessarily correspond to what individuals actually pay in taxes. This affects both redistributive outcomes as well as individual's political attitudes towards taxation. Depending on the avoidance technology different political equilibria emerge. When the tax avoidance possibilities are limited, the classical conflict between rich and poor is sustained. If the tax avoidance technology is more effective, however, the equilibrium outcome can change to a situation characterized by a coalition of poor and the very richest favoring a higher tax rate. When comparing the model's predictions with data on income inequality and evidence of avoidance activity it comes surprisingly close to actual observations.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 530

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General ; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
• Subject: Political equilibrium ; Redistribution ; Tax avoidance ; Non-median voter equilibrium ; Steuervermeidung ; Steuertheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Roine, Jesper
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56080
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET