Arbeitspapier
The political economics of not paying taxes
This paper considers redistributive as well as political consequences of tax avoidance. When investing in tax avoidance is possible, the official tax rate does not necessarily correspond to what individuals actually pay in taxes. This affects both redistributive outcomes as well as individual's political attitudes towards taxation. Depending on the avoidance technology different political equilibria emerge. When the tax avoidance possibilities are limited, the classical conflict between rich and poor is sustained. If the tax avoidance technology is more effective, however, the equilibrium outcome can change to a situation characterized by a coalition of poor and the very richest favoring a higher tax rate. When comparing the model's predictions with data on income inequality and evidence of avoidance activity it comes surprisingly close to actual observations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 530
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
- Thema
-
Political equilibrium
Redistribution
Tax avoidance
Non-median voter equilibrium
Steuervermeidung
Steuertheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Roine, Jesper
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Roine, Jesper
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Entstanden
- 2003
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