Arbeitspapier
Rent seeking and organizational structure
A hierarchically structured rent-seeking contest may be associated with lower equilibrium expenditure than a corresponding flat contest. In this chapter we discuss how this fact may be used to explain the structure of organizations such as firms, including why firms commonly have outside owners.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 749
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Firm Organization and Market Structure
- Thema
-
rent seeking
contests
hierarchy
ownership of firms
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Wärneryd, Karl
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Wärneryd, Karl
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Entstanden
- 2014
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