Rent-seeking in elite networks

Arbeitspapier

We employ a unique dataset on members of an elite service club in Germany to investigate how social connections in elite networks affect the allocation of resources. Specifically, we investigate credit allocation decisions of banks to firms inside the network. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we document misallocation of bank credit inside the network, with bankers with weakly aligned incentives engaging most actively in crony lending. Our findings, thus, resonate with existing theories of elite networks as rent extractive coalitions that stifle economic prosperity.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 132

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Lending and Debt Problems ; International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation ; Bankruptcy; Liquidation ; Other Substantive Areas of Law: Other

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Haselmann, Rainer ; Schoenherr, David ; Vig, Vikrant
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.2139/ssrn.2911062
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149751
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ