Arbeitspapier

Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games

We investigate the effects of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the deterministic contest a contestant receives a share of the rent equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures, while in the stochastic contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures. In deterministic contests average expenditures converge to equilibrium levels when subjects only get feedback about own earnings, and additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings raises average expenditures. In stochastic contests information feedback has an opposite, and even stronger, effect: when subjects only get feedback on own earnings we observe high levels of rent dissipation, usually exceeding the value of the rent, and additional feedback about rivals' choices and earnings has a significant moderating influence on expenditures. In a follow-up treatment we endogenize information feedback by allowing contestants in a stochastic contest to make "public" or "private" expenditures. Subjects make the vast majority of expenditures privately and overall excess expenditures are similar to the stochastic contest with own feedback.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2013-02

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
contests
rent-seeking
information feedback
learning
experiments

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fallucchi, Francesco
Renner, Elke
Sefton, Martin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
(wo)
Nottingham
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fallucchi, Francesco
  • Renner, Elke
  • Sefton, Martin
  • The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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