Hochschulschrift
Reforming private antitrust enforcement in Europe : between harmonisation and regulatory competition
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISBN
-
9783428144259
3428144252
- Dimensions
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24 cm, 400 g
- Extent
-
186 S.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
Zugl.: Kiel, Univ., Diss., 2013
- Bibliographic citation
-
Schriften zum Wirtschaftsrecht ; Bd. 259
- Keyword
- Table of contents
- Rights
-
Bei diesem Objekt liegt nur das Inhaltsverzeichnis digital vor. Der Zugriff darauf ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
11.06.2025, 2:17 PM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Hochschulschrift
Associated
- Kammin, Julian
- Duncker & Humblot
Time of origin
- 2014
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