Arbeitspapier
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment
This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 372
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Subject
-
Repeated moral hazard
Sequential hidden actions
Laboratory experiment
Moral Hazard
Vertragsrecht
Zeit
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Nieken, Petra
Schmitz, Patrick W.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
-
München
- (when)
-
2012
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13182
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13182-0
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nieken, Petra
- Schmitz, Patrick W.
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2012
Other Objects (12)
Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality
Loss aversion, moral hazard, and stochastic contracts
Moral Hazard and Bargaining over Incentive Contracts
Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard
Analysis of inappropriate repeated laboratory testing
Moral hazard contracts: does one size fit all?
Moral hazard contracts : does one size fit all?
An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity conservation contracts
A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts
Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?
Double-sided moral hazard in job displacement insurance contracts
Double-Sided Moral Hazard in Job Displacement Insurance Contracts
Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality
Loss aversion, moral hazard, and stochastic contracts
Moral Hazard and Bargaining over Incentive Contracts
Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard
Analysis of inappropriate repeated laboratory testing
Moral hazard contracts: does one size fit all?
Moral hazard contracts : does one size fit all?
An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity conservation contracts
A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts
Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?
Double-sided moral hazard in job displacement insurance contracts
Double-Sided Moral Hazard in Job Displacement Insurance Contracts
Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality
Loss aversion, moral hazard, and stochastic contracts
Moral Hazard and Bargaining over Incentive Contracts
Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard
Analysis of inappropriate repeated laboratory testing
Moral hazard contracts: does one size fit all?
Moral hazard contracts : does one size fit all?
An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity conservation contracts
A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long-Term Contracts
Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?
Double-sided moral hazard in job displacement insurance contracts