Arbeitspapier
Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions
Within the framework of the common value model, we examine the magnitude of the difference in expected outcome between first-price and second-price sealed bid auctions. The study is limited to two empirical specifications of bidders signals: Weibull and normal distribution. The optimal bid functions and the expected procurers cost under both auction formats are derived. Simulations are undertaken to analyze the impact that random draws of signals have on the differences in outcome from the two auction formats. Using estimates from structural estimation in previous empirical work on first-price auction data, where Weibull and normal distributions of signals have been applied, the hypothetical expected gain from switching from a first-price sealed bid auction to a second-price sealed bid auction mechanism is computed.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1999:17
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
- Thema
-
Common value auctions
procurement
Vickrey auction
Auktionstheorie
Beschaffung
Signalling
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lunander, Anders
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Uppsala
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2463
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lunander, Anders
- Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1999
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