Arbeitspapier
Bid Costs and the (In)efficiency of Public Procurement Auctions
The paper analyzes the excess entry hypothesis for sealed-bid first price public procurement auctions.The hypothesis is proved analytically for any feasible combination of bid preparation cost and bid evaluation cost when the bidders face a rectangular cost density function and confirmed in numerical simulations based on a family of flexible cost density functions. The excess entry hypothesis implies that the procurer may reduce both his own cost and the social cost by imposing a positive fee on the bids. Sequential search is a superior strategy to a public procurement auction whether or not the procurer imposes an optimal fee on the bids.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working paper ; No. 1-2019
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
-
Excess entry
Public procurement auctions
Optimal fee
Sequential search
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Blomgren-Hansen, Niels
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Frederiksberg
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Blomgren-Hansen, Niels
- Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2019
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