Security bid auctions for agency contracts

Arbeitspapier

A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. 'Steeper' securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the two highest valuations, yet reduce effort incentives. In view of this trade-off, the generalized equity auction that includes a (possibly negative) cash reward to the winner tends to outperform all other auctions, although it cannot extract the entire surplus implement efficient effort. Hence, profit sharing emerges without risk aversion or limited liability.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 371

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Rationing; Licensing
• Thema: Auctions ; agency problems ; licensing ; innovation ; mechanism design ; Erfolgsbeteiligung ; Aktienoption ; Auktionstheorie ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie ; Anreizvertrag ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jun, Byoung Heon ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13183
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94033
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13183-5
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ