An Asymmetric Duopoly Model of Price Framing

Abstract: This note considers an asymmetric duopoly model of price-frame competition in homogeneous product markets. The firms choose simultaneously prices and price formats, and frame differentiation limits price comparability leading to consumer confusion. Here, one firm is more salient than its rival and attracts a larger share of confused consumers. In duopoly equilibrium, the firms randomize on both prices and frames, make strictly positive profits, and pricing is frame-independent. However, the prominent firm sets a higher average price and charges the monopoly price with positive probability. Higher prominence boosts expected profit for both the industry and the salient firm but may harm the rival’s expected profit.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: An Asymmetric Duopoly Model of Price Framing ; volume:19 ; number:2 ; year:2018 ; extent:7 ; The B.E. journal of theoretical economics ; 19, Heft 2 (2018) (gesamt 7)

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Urheber: Chioveanu, Ioana

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2018-0068
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2409011628120.647463035165
• Rechteinformation: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.08.2025, 07:22 MESZ