Arbeitspapier

Pairing Games and Markets

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 48.2014

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Subject
Stable Matching
Competitive Equilibrium
Market Design
NTU Assignment Game
Roommate Problem
Coalition Formation
Bargaining Set
Bilateral Transaction
Gallai Edmonds Decomposition

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Alkan, Ahmet
Tuncay, Alparslan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Alkan, Ahmet
  • Tuncay, Alparslan
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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