Arbeitspapier
Positive Expectations Feedback Experiments and Number Guessing Games as Models of Financial Markets
In repeated number guessing games choices typically converge quickly to the Nash equilibrium. In positive expectations feedback experiments, however, convergence to the equilibrium price tends to be very slow, if it occurs at all. Both types of experimental designs have been suggested as modeling essential aspects of financial markets. In order to isolate the source of the differences in outcomes we present several new treatments in this paper. We conclude that the feedback strength (i.e. the ‘p-value’ in standard number guessing games) is essential for the results. Furthermore, positive expectations feedback experiments may provide good representations of highly speculative markets while standard number guessing games model financial markets with more emphasis on dividend yield and value stocks.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-076/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- Thema
-
number guessing game
beauty contest game
expectations feedback systems
Wiederholte Spiele
Lernprozess
Finanzmarkt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Sonnemans, Joep
Tuinstra, Jan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sonnemans, Joep
- Tuinstra, Jan
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2008
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