Arbeitspapier

Gender pairing and bargaining: Beware the same sex!

We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party's gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2008-27

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
gender pairing
bargaining
psychology
experiment
Verhandlungstheorie
Test
Geschlecht
Allokationseffizienz
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sutter, Matthias
Bosman, Ronald
Kocher, Martin
van Winden, Frans
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
(wo)
Innsbruck
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sutter, Matthias
  • Bosman, Ronald
  • Kocher, Martin
  • van Winden, Frans
  • University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance

Entstanden

  • 2008

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