Arbeitspapier
Convex games, clan games, and their marginal games
We provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. As it turns out, a cooperative game is convex if and only if all its marginal games are superadditive, and a monotonic game satisfying the veto player property with respect to the members of a coalition C is a total clan game (with clan C) if and only if all its C-based marginal games are subadditive.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Papers ; No. 368
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
Characterization
Convex games
Marginal games
Subadditive games
Superadditive games
Total clan games
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Koalition
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Branzei, Rodica
Dimitrov, Dinko
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7332
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Branzei, Rodica
- Dimitrov, Dinko
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2005