Arbeitspapier

Convex games, clan games, and their marginal games

We provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. As it turns out, a cooperative game is convex if and only if all its marginal games are superadditive, and a monotonic game satisfying the veto player property with respect to the members of a coalition C is a total clan game (with clan C) if and only if all its C-based marginal games are subadditive.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Papers ; No. 368

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Subject
Characterization
Convex games
Marginal games
Subadditive games
Superadditive games
Total clan games
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Koalition
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Branzei, Rodica
Dimitrov, Dinko
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
(where)
Bielefeld
(when)
2005

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7332
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Branzei, Rodica
  • Dimitrov, Dinko
  • Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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