Arbeitspapier
Institutional competition, political process and holdup
We compare the effect of legal and institutional competition for the design of labor institutions in an environment characterized by holdup problems in human and physical capital. We compare autarky with the two country case, assuming that capital is perfectly mobile and labor immobile. We distinguish two cases. In the first, the political system is free from capture, while in the second, we examine the case where labor captures the institutional design problem. We find that in the former case, a competition of systems reduces welfare while in the latter it improves the overall outcome.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2006,027
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Deffains, Bruno
Demougin, Dominique M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Deffains, Bruno
- Demougin, Dominique M.
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
Entstanden
- 2006
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup
Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?
Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem
Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem
Antitrust holdup source, cross-national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context
Antitrust holdup source, cross-national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context
Antitrust holdup source, cross-national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context
Institutions, Holdup and Automation
Institutions, Holdup and Automation
Learning through institutional competition
Competition, regulation and institutional quality
Equity Stakes and Hold-up Problems
Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup
Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?
Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem
Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem
Antitrust holdup source, cross-national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context
Antitrust holdup source, cross-national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context
Antitrust holdup source, cross-national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context
Institutions, Holdup and Automation
Institutions, Holdup and Automation
Learning through institutional competition
Competition, regulation and institutional quality
Equity Stakes and Hold-up Problems
Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup
Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?
Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem
Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem
Antitrust holdup source, cross-national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context
Antitrust holdup source, cross-national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context
Antitrust holdup source, cross-national institutional variation, and corporate political strategy implications for domestic mergers in a global context
Institutions, Holdup and Automation
Institutions, Holdup and Automation
Learning through institutional competition
Competition, regulation and institutional quality