Arbeitspapier
Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players
This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a society with many groups, where it is cheaper to connect within groups as compared to across groups, strategic play by individuals leads to a network architecture in which there is a core group which is entirely internally connected while all the other groups are entirely externally linked and hence completely fragmented. Since internal/within group links are cheaper to form, this implies that individual incentives may generate a significant waste of valuable social resources.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 02-069/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other
- Subject
-
Noncooperative games
Network formation
Heterogeneity
Spieltheorie
Lernprozess
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Theorie
Soziales Netzwerk
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Galeotti, Andrea
Goyal, Sanjeev
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2002
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Galeotti, Andrea
- Goyal, Sanjeev
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2002
Other Objects (12)
Network Formation under Heterogeneous Costs: The Multiple Group Model
Heterogeneous Agents, Human Capital Formation and International Income Inequality
Learning, Network Formation and Coordination
Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining
Unemployment and Search Externalities in a Model with Heterogeneous Jobs and Heterogeneous Workers
Coarse Tolling with Heterogeneous Preferences
Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Adoption of Superior Technology in Markets with Heterogeneous Network Externalities and Price Competition
Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance
Heterogeneous Agent Models: Two Simple Case Studies
Network games with heterogeneous players
Network games with heterogeneous players
Network Formation under Heterogeneous Costs: The Multiple Group Model
Heterogeneous Agents, Human Capital Formation and International Income Inequality
Learning, Network Formation and Coordination
Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining
Unemployment and Search Externalities in a Model with Heterogeneous Jobs and Heterogeneous Workers
Coarse Tolling with Heterogeneous Preferences
Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Adoption of Superior Technology in Markets with Heterogeneous Network Externalities and Price Competition
Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance
Heterogeneous Agent Models: Two Simple Case Studies
Network games with heterogeneous players
Network games with heterogeneous players
Network Formation under Heterogeneous Costs: The Multiple Group Model
Heterogeneous Agents, Human Capital Formation and International Income Inequality
Learning, Network Formation and Coordination
Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining
Unemployment and Search Externalities in a Model with Heterogeneous Jobs and Heterogeneous Workers
Coarse Tolling with Heterogeneous Preferences
Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Adoption of Superior Technology in Markets with Heterogeneous Network Externalities and Price Competition
Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance
Heterogeneous Agent Models: Two Simple Case Studies
Network games with heterogeneous players