Arbeitspapier
Partial norms
We consider an expanded notion of social norms that renders them belief-dependent and partial, formulate a series of related testable predictions, and design an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game that tests for empirical relevance. Main results: Normative beliefs influence generosity, as predicted. Degree of partiality leads to more dispersion in giving behavior, as predicted.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7568
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
- Subject
-
social norms
partial norms
normative expectations
consensus
experiment
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
D'Adda, Giovanna
Dufwenberg, Martin
Passarelli, Francesco
Tabellini, Guido
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2019
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- D'Adda, Giovanna
- Dufwenberg, Martin
- Passarelli, Francesco
- Tabellini, Guido
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2019
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