Arbeitspapier
Partial norms
We consider an expanded notion of social norms that renders them belief-dependent and partial, formulate a series of related testable predictions, and design an experiment based on a variant of the dictator game that tests for empirical relevance. Main results: Normative beliefs influence generosity, as predicted. Degree of partiality leads to more dispersion in giving behavior, as predicted.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7568
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
- Thema
-
social norms
partial norms
normative expectations
consensus
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
D'Adda, Giovanna
Dufwenberg, Martin
Passarelli, Francesco
Tabellini, Guido
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- D'Adda, Giovanna
- Dufwenberg, Martin
- Passarelli, Francesco
- Tabellini, Guido
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2019
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