The determinants of election to the United Nations Security Council

Arbeitspapier

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks - election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3902

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; International Institutional Arrangements ; International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
• Thema: United Nations Security Council ; turn-taking norm ; elections ; Internationale Organisation ; Wahl ; Internationale Sicherheit ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dreher, Axel ; Gould, Matthew ; Rablen, Matthew ; Vreeland, James Raymond
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/61040
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ