Learning by observing

Arbeitspapier

We introduce a network formation model based on the idea that individuals engage in production (or decide to participate in an action) depending on the similar actions of the people they observe in the society. We differentiate from the classical models of participation by letting individuals to choose, non-cooperatively, which agents to observe. Observing behavior of others is a costly activity but provides benefits in terms of reduction in cost of production for the observing agent, which we take it as learning. In this non-cooperative setting we provide complete characterization of both Nash stable and socially efficient network configurations. We show that every society can admit a stable network. Moreover, typically there will be multiple stable configurations that will be available for a society. While all stable networks will not be efficient, we show that every efficient network will be stable.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Papers in Economics ; No. 10/07

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
• Thema: Networks ; Network formation ; Self organization ; Stable networks ; Nash networks ; Participation Games ; Learning ; Lernen ; Soziales Netzwerk ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Postalcı, Efe
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Izmir University of Economics, Department of Economics
• (wo): Izmir
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/175916
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ