Arbeitspapier

Raising rivals' costs with environmental regulation: An intertemporal lobbying approach

This paper addresses the question why a lot of firms demand stricter environmental regulation. With non-identical producers within the same industry, lobbying for tighter environmental rules turns out to be an important strategy of raising rivals' costs. Furthermore, the paper explains when the potential target firms of stricter regulation in such an intra-industrial competition engage in counter-lobbying and when they remain silent.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 263

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Subject
Lobbying
Environmental Regulation
Umweltpolitik
Interessenpolitik
Duopol
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Körber, Achim
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
(where)
Konstanz
(when)
1995

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Körber, Achim
  • Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 1995

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