Performance Pay and Malnutrition

Arbeitspapier

We carry out a randomized controlled experiment in West Bengal, India to test three separate performance pay treatments in the public health sector. Performance is judged on improvements in child malnutrition. We exogenously change wages of government employed child care workers through either absolute or relative incentives. We also test for the impact of high and low absolute incentives. Results show that high absolute incentives reduce severe malnutrition by 6.3 percentage points over three months. Result is consistent with a reported increase in protein-rich diet at home in the high absolute treatment. There are no significant effects on health outcomes of other incentive arms. Results remain robust to propensity score matching, reversion- to-mean and a placebo check.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10084

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Health Behavior ; Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs ; Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy
• Thema: performance pay ; child malnutrition ; absolute and relative incentives

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Singh, Prakarsh ; Mitra, Sandip
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145218
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ