Artikel
Coordination and cooperation problems in network good production
If actors want to reach a particular goal, they are often better off forming collaborative relations and investing together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an experiment in which coordination problems are mainly due to finding partners for collaboration, while cooperation problems arise at the investment levels of partners who have already agreed to collaborate. The results show that as costs of forming links increase, groups succeed less often in solving the coordination problem. Still, if subjects are able to solve the coordination problem, they invest in a suboptimal way in the network good. It is mostly found that if cooperation is successful in terms of investment, it is due to subjects being able to monitor how much their partners invest. Moreover, subjects deal better with the coordination and cooperation problems as they gain experience.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 357-380 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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network formation
coordination
cooperation
experiments
collective goods
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Knigge, Antonie
Buskens, Vincent
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2010
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g1040357
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Knigge, Antonie
- Buskens, Vincent
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2010
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