Arbeitspapier
Games on Union Closed Systems
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to every TU-game. In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. So, instead of allowing all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of N. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value) are given for games on union closed systems.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-036/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
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TU-game
restricted cooperation
union closed system
core
prekernel
nucleolus
Transferable Utility Games
Core
Kooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
van den Brink, Rene
Katsev, Ilya
van der Laan, Gerard
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- van den Brink, Rene
- Katsev, Ilya
- van der Laan, Gerard
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2011
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Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting
Evolution in Games with a Continuous Action Space
The Conception of the Individual in Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Altruism, Fairness and Evolution: the Case for Repeated Stochastic Games
Efficiency and Collusion Neutrality of Solutions for Cooperative TU-Games
Cooperative Games on Accessible Union Stable Systems
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