Note on 'Competition in Two-sided Markets'

Arbeitspapier

We extend the models in ("Competition in two-sided markets" of Armstrong (2006, Rand Journal of Economics) by adding within-group externalities. In the monopoly and duopoly cases, positive within-group externalities reduce the price of the own group. Negative externalities have an opposite price effect. In the case of a competitive bottleneck, we show by examples that within a certain range of parameter values, a novel phenomenon arises that the platform attracts more agents from one of the groups compared with the social optimum.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 15-080/II

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Competition economics ; two-sided market

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Zeng, Yuyu ; Houba, Harold ; van der Laan, Gerard
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125082
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET