Arbeitspapier
Inflation Forecast Contracts
We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers’ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more effectively, thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation. Inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts, but have adverse consequences for output. On balance, paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 11/149
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Thema
-
central banks
incentive contracts
transparency
inflation targeting
inflation forecast targeting
intermediate targets
Inflationssteuerung
Inflationserwartung
Politische Kommunikation
Experten
Leistungsanreiz
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gersbach, Hans
Hahn, Volker
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-006562013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gersbach, Hans
- Hahn, Volker
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2011
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