The Principal-Agent Matching Market

Arbeitspapier

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 945

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: principal-agent ; moral hazard ; matching ; implementation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Dam, Kaniska
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76350
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET