Arbeitspapier

The role of budget constraints in sequential elimination tournaments

Motivated by the EU concept of Pre-Commercial Procurement and the massivepresence of SMEs in the European economy, we study how budget constraints affect R&D effort in sequential elimination tournaments. We show that introducingbudget constraints leads to a non-monotonicity in unconstrained contestants' effort.Furthermore, we show that if the budget asymmetry is not too large, unconstrainedcontestants exert higher effort than when faced with unconstrained contestants only.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1777

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
Subject
Pre-Commercial Procurement
Contests
Budget constraints

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Arve, Malin
Chiappinelli, Olga
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Arve, Malin
  • Chiappinelli, Olga
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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