Arbeitspapier

Politico-economic causes of labor regulation in the United States: Rent seeking, alliances, raising Rivals' costs (even lowering one's own?), and interjurisdictional competition

This paper offers an eclectic survey of the political economy of labor regulation in the United States at federal and state levels along the dimensions of occupational health and safety, unjust dismissal, right-to-work, workplace safety and workers' compensation, living wages, and prevailing wages. We discuss rent seeking/predation, coalition formation, judicial review, and interjurisdictional competition as well as the implications of union decline. Our analysis should help dispel any notion that the U.S. labor market is unregulated while also indicating that the political process shows some sensitivity to benefits and costs.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2381

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Addison, John T.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2006

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090406166
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Addison, John T.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2006

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