Arbeitspapier

Politico-economic causes of labor regulation in the United States: Rent seeking, alliances, raising Rivals' costs (even lowering one's own?), and interjurisdictional competition

This paper offers an eclectic survey of the political economy of labor regulation in the United States at federal and state levels along the dimensions of occupational health and safety, unjust dismissal, right-to-work, workplace safety and workers' compensation, living wages, and prevailing wages. We discuss rent seeking/predation, coalition formation, judicial review, and interjurisdictional competition as well as the implications of union decline. Our analysis should help dispel any notion that the U.S. labor market is unregulated while also indicating that the political process shows some sensitivity to benefits and costs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2381

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Addison, John T.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2006

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090406166
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Addison, John T.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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