Self-Allocation in Contests

Arbeitspapier

We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice of contest, results in the allocation of players to contests that maximizes aggregate equilibrium effort. For a class of oligopoly models that are equivalent to contests, this implies output maximization.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6636

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: contests ; self-allocation ; effort maximization ; quantity competition

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bernergard, Axel ; Wärneryd, Karl
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171100
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ