Arbeitspapier

Enhanced cooperation in an asymmetric model of tax competition

This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability of tax rates are crucial for the welfare effects of enhanced cooperation. Simulations show that enhanced cooperation is unlikely to be feasible for small countries. When enhanced cooperation is feasible, it may hamper global harmonization. Only when countries are of similar size is global harmonization a feasible outcome.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2915

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policy
International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
tax coordination
asymmetry
enhanced cooperation agreements
strategic tax response
Unternehmensbesteuerung
Steuerharmonisierung
Steuerwettbewerb
Optimale Besteuerung
Mehr-Länder-Modell
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vrijburg, Hendrik
De Mooij, Ruud A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vrijburg, Hendrik
  • De Mooij, Ruud A.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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