Arbeitspapier
Enhanced cooperation in an asymmetric model of tax competition
This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability of tax rates are crucial for the welfare effects of enhanced cooperation. Simulations show that enhanced cooperation is unlikely to be feasible for small countries. When enhanced cooperation is feasible, it may hamper global harmonization. Only when countries are of similar size is global harmonization a feasible outcome.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2915
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Fiscal Policy
International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
- Thema
-
tax coordination
asymmetry
enhanced cooperation agreements
strategic tax response
Unternehmensbesteuerung
Steuerharmonisierung
Steuerwettbewerb
Optimale Besteuerung
Mehr-Länder-Modell
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Vrijburg, Hendrik
De Mooij, Ruud A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Vrijburg, Hendrik
- De Mooij, Ruud A.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2010