Information Sharing, Multiple Nash Equilibria, and Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition

Arbeitspapier

We analyze tax competition between large and asymmetric countries and derive conditions under which countries assist foreign authorities in collecting tax revenues via information exchange. It turns out that voluntary exchange of information is a Nash equilibrium between asymmetric countries, resulting in an efficient use of taxes by governments. However, this equilibrium is not unique and the structure of the resulting equilibrium-selection problem depends on the relative size of countries. Our model gives an explanation for the empirical observation that especially smaller countries are reluctant to co-ordinate on the full-information equilibrium, whereas countries of similar size kan solve the information problem.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 2002-01

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Steuerwettbewerb ; Steuertarif ; Direktinvestition ; Asymmetrische Information ; Informationsverbreitung ; Steuertheorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Eggert, Wolfgang ; Kolmar, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
• (wo): Copenhagen
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82048
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ