Arbeitspapier

Market Structure and Advance Selling

When products are sold in advance, i.e. prior to consumption, consumers trade off an early, uninformed purchase at a low price against a late, informed purchase at a high price. This paper considers the effect of market structure on the prevalence of advance selling. We show that in an oligopolistic market with multi-product firms, advance selling (with its associated allocative inefficiency) is decreasing in market concentration when the consumers’ preference uncertainty is high but can be increasing when uncertainty is low.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 16-020/VII

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
Competition
Price Discrimination
Individual Demand Uncertainty
Advance Purchase Discounts

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Möller, Marc
Watanabe, Makoto
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Möller, Marc
  • Watanabe, Makoto
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2016

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