Arbeitspapier
Market Structure and Advance Selling
When products are sold in advance, i.e. prior to consumption, consumers trade off an early, uninformed purchase at a low price against a late, informed purchase at a high price. This paper considers the effect of market structure on the prevalence of advance selling. We show that in an oligopolistic market with multi-product firms, advance selling (with its associated allocative inefficiency) is decreasing in market concentration when the consumers’ preference uncertainty is high but can be increasing when uncertainty is low.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 16-020/VII
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Subject
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Competition
Price Discrimination
Individual Demand Uncertainty
Advance Purchase Discounts
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Möller, Marc
Watanabe, Makoto
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2016
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Möller, Marc
- Watanabe, Makoto
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2016