Market Structure and Advance Selling

Arbeitspapier

When products are sold in advance, i.e. prior to consumption, consumers trade off an early, uninformed purchase at a low price against a late, informed purchase at a high price. This paper considers the effect of market structure on the prevalence of advance selling. We show that in an oligopolistic market with multi-product firms, advance selling (with its associated allocative inefficiency) is decreasing in market concentration when the consumers’ preference uncertainty is high but can be increasing when uncertainty is low.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 16-020/VII

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: Competition ; Price Discrimination ; Individual Demand Uncertainty ; Advance Purchase Discounts

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Möller, Marc ; Watanabe, Makoto
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130508
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET