Arbeitspapier

Market Structure and Advance Selling

When products are sold in advance, i.e. prior to consumption, consumers trade off an early, uninformed purchase at a low price against a late, informed purchase at a high price. This paper considers the effect of market structure on the prevalence of advance selling. We show that in an oligopolistic market with multi-product firms, advance selling (with its associated allocative inefficiency) is decreasing in market concentration when the consumers’ preference uncertainty is high but can be increasing when uncertainty is low.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 16-020/VII

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
Competition
Price Discrimination
Individual Demand Uncertainty
Advance Purchase Discounts

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Möller, Marc
Watanabe, Makoto
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Möller, Marc
  • Watanabe, Makoto
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2016

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